Why?
Men do not think they know a thing till they have grasped the "why" of it.
- Aristotle
The question "why?" through which many of the classical problems of philosophy are expressed, involves at least four conditions:
There is what seems prima facie to be a contingent fact;
There is a presupposition that (1) must have a reason, cause or explanation for being the case, rather than otherwise;
The subject does not presently know such reason, cause or explanation for (1); and
The subject is interested to know the reason, cause or explanation for (1).
All of the above conditions are present in the following examples: A watcher in a chess game asks a player why he made a certain move. The watcher, not knowing the reason for it, wants to know why the chess player made that particular move, rather than another which, from the watcher's point of view, is an equally possible move. From this point of view, therefore, the move made was an apparently contingent one.
Another example: Two people are lost in a forest. One of them says, "Let's go in this direction (indicating a particular direction). The other asks, "Why in that direction?" From the inquirer's point of view, the direction pointed to by his companion is contingent in that, in view of his ignorance, any other direction seemed just as good or bad). Therefore he wants to know why they had to go in a particular direction, rather than in another.
The reason why the fact presented is only prima facie contingent (something that apparently could have been otherwise) is that the answer to the question is supposed to necessitate it. That is, from the viewpoint of the answer, if it is a satisfactory one, the fact presented would now appear to be either a necessary one (something that could not be conceived to be otherwise) or the best among possible alternatives [Cf. Leibniz: "If, moreover, (a man) chooses that which he sees less useful and less agreeable, it will have become perhaps to him the most agreeable through caprice...." (Letter to Coste, 1701.)].
In some cases, the question "why?" has five conditions:
There is a prior expectation that some fact is or would be the case;
There is a present fact whose being or occurrence is incompatible with the expected fact;
There is a presupposition that (2) has reason, cause or explanation for being the case, rather than (1);
The subject does not presently know the reason, cause or explanation for (2); and
The subject is interested to know the reason, cause or explanation for (2)
The following illustration satisfies the above case: A popular candidate for public office loses to a relatively unknown opponent. In this case, some people would wonder why this happened. (1) is the prior expectation, based on common sense and experience, that the popular candidate would win the election. (2) is his losing instead to a relatively unknown opponent. (3) is the presupposition that there must be a reason, cause or explanation why (2) happened, instead of the expected event. (4) is the fact that such reason, cause or explanation is presently unknown to the persons involved. (5) is the desire of those involved to know why (2) happened.
Another example: at a restaurant, a customer orders a certain dish, but is given a different one instead. He asks, "Why are you giving me this dish, instead of the one I ordered?" (1) is his prior expectation that he would be given the dish he ordered? (2) is his being served a different one instead. (3) is there a presumption that there must be a reason, cause or explanation for (2). (4) is it a fact that the customer does not presently know the reason, cause or explanation for the unusual happening. (5) is it his desire to know such reason, cause or explanation for (2)?
As one can see, in the second analysis, the questions generated are mixed with a feeling of puzzlement on the part of the asker. There is also present some sense of frustration, if the unexpected occurrence is undesirable and the expected one desirable; or a feeling of pleasant surprise in the contrary case.
A third analysis may be given for the question "why." Instances of this type are cases where the subject is unable to see any possible reason, cause or explanation for the illustration of the fact in question. In these cases, the question is rhetorical. It is asked to express bewilderment, surprise, anger, frustration or some other emotion. The specific conditions are:
The subject holds certain strong presuppositions which are either articulated or not;
A fact is present to him whose illustration is incompatible with his presuppositions.
In view of his presuppositions he cannot see any reason, cause or explanation for the presented fact;
The incompatibility between his presuppositions and the presented fact irritates him.
Something like this happens in the case of our second example (the restaurant case) to our second analysis of the question "why," especially if the subject is in a bad mood. He cannot or would not-accept any explanation for the error.
I believe that Job's case falls under this analysis. Job was a deeply religious man who was visited by a series of terrible misfortunes. It was an old presupposition that God punishes a man for his sins by visiting him with misfortunes. Since Job was a religious man, he could not see why God should visit him with the terrible misfortunes that he suffered. He finally surrendered himself to the inscrutable will of God.
Philosophical "whys" are susceptible of all three analyses, depending upon how they are framed or expressed by the philosopher or person concerned. For instance, Leibniz asked why this particular world, rather than another, exists. In this question, no rational expectation is expressed that another particular world order should obtain rather than the one that is actually illustrated, since obviously any other world order would be equally susceptible to the question. Leibniz's question is directed rather against what appears to be the seeming contingency of the world and seeks to supply an answer which would provide it with a principle of necessitation, in view of which the world order that actually exists would be necessary, Leibniz answered his question by hypothesizing that the world as it exists is the best of all posible worlds and that God is rationally determined to create, from among the possible worlds, the best. Therefore, he argued, the world as it exists cannot be otherwise, Leibniz's question conforms to our first analysis.
On the other hand, a question like Heidegger's could conform to either the second or the third analysis, depending upon the philosopher's attitude as to its answerability. Heidegger asked why there is a world at all, rather than nothing. Here, the a priori presupposition is that no world should exist -- that there should be nothing[An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 20.], instead of something. The existence of the world is problematic in view of such presupposition. Heidegger himself held the view that the ontological problem is unanswerable. According to him, philosophy begins with the question and ends with it. Compare this with the following quotation from William James:
Not only that anything should be, but that this very thing should be, is mysterious. Philosophy stares but brings no reasoned solution, for from nothing to being there is no logical bridge.[Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 39. ]
There have been, however, philosophers who held almost the opposite view that being is logically preferable to non-being and argued, in effect, that the rational expectation should be that of a plenum of all possibles. Anaximander held this view and taught that the originative state is such a plenum of indeterminate character, and from which the existents come to be through the separation of opposites.[Cf. Simplicius Phys. 24, 13. ]
Parmenides likewise contended that Being is the original ontological posit under the Principle of Identity and that to claim that non-being exists is self-contradictory. His Being is a neutral state among all the contingents that can be imagined. Since, however, he denied contingency, he held that there is no logical bridge between Being and the phenomenal world, which he regarded as an illusion.[Cf. Parmenidean fragments in Kirk and Raven, pp. 263-285.]
Yet another type of solution to the ontological problem is that of Hegel, who, like Anaximander and Parmenides posited an original Being. This is characterless to begin with and soon generates its opposite Non-being. The dialectical interaction between the two gives rise to the historical world of Becoming.
One of the great problems of metaphysicians, however, has been to bridge the gap between the presupposed original Non-being or Being (as we shall see later, these opposite presuppositions are generable from the same logical rule) and the world of contingent existence. So far, no metaphysician has succeeded in eliminating contingency from his system. According to Whitehead:
There can be no reason external to history, why this flux rather than another flux should have been illustrated.[Process and Reality, p. 64. ]
Most philosophers of today agree that the problems of metaphysics are unanswerable. The following passage from A. O. Lovejoy is typical:
There is scarcely a general contrast between the Platonic strain in European thought down to the late eighteenth century and the philosophy of more recent times than this. For to acknowledge that such questions are necessarily insoluble or meaningless is to imply that, so far as we can judge, the world is in final analysis non-rational, that its being at all, and its possessing the extent that it has and the range of diversity which its components exhibit, and its conformity to the very primary laws which empirical science discovers---that these are just brute facts for which no intelligible reason can be given, and which might equally have been other than they are.[A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, p. 47.]
One notices that in the above passage what makes Lovejoy think the world to be non-rational is what appears to be its radical contingency: that things "might equally have been other than they are."
According to Aristotle, "All men by nature desire to know."[Metaphysics, Bk. I 980a 1] And scientific knowledge consists in knowing the cause on which the fact depends. The relation between the fact and the cause is such that, in view of the cause, the fact cannot be otherwise. In other words, the cause necessitates the fact. Aristotle says that the proper object of scientific knowledge, as opposed to the "accidental" knowledge of the sophists, is something which cannot be other than it is.[Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, 71b10] From the foregoing, Aristotle believed that everything that is is necessary, for that which cannot be otherwise it is is precisely that which is necessary.
The belief in necessity in the history of philosophy can be traced as far back as Anaximander, whom we have already mentioned. He said that
... the source of coming-to-be for existing things is that into which destruction, too, happens according to necessity... [100 cit.]
Likewise, Heraclitus said that
All things happen according to strife and necessity. [Fr. 80, Arigen c. Celsum VI, 42 ]
Democritus, the materialist, had the same assumption. He claimed that
Nothing occurs at random, but everything for a reason and by necessity. [Fr. 2 Aetius I, 25, 4 ]
And Plato said what amounts to the same thing:
All that becomes do so through a cause. Without a cause, nothing can come to be.[Timaeus, 28A ]
In modern times, Spinoza is the main proponent for the doctrine of necessity. According to him, there are no accidental things and he "proves" it thus:
That which has no cause cannot possibly exist; that which is accidental has no cause. Therefore... The first is beyond all dispute; the second we prove thus: If anything that is accidental has a definite and certain cause why it should exist, then it must necessarily exist; but that it should be both accidental and necessary at the same time, is self-contradictory; Therefore ...[God, Man and His Well-being, Ch. IV.]
It is obvious that Spinoza holds causality to be a universal a priori principle and a self-evident one at that.
Likewise, Leibniz held that nothing happens without a sufficient reason. He referred to this principle as the most noble principle of sufficient reason. Elaborating on this principle, he said:
There are two first principles of all reasonings, the principle of contradiction ... and the principle that a reason must be given, i. e., that every true proposition which is not known per se, has an a priori proof, or that a reason can be given for every truth, or as is commonly said, that nothing happens without a cause. Arithmetic and Geometry do not need this principle, but Physics and Mechanics do ...[Wiener, 93, 94.]
A contemporary of Leibniz, however, David Hume, presented cogent arguments against necessity and causality in favor of radical contingency. These arguments have become and still are very popular in philosophical and scientific circles. He contended that causal relations are not logically grounded and that they are in fact contingent; that the relation of cause and effect may be analyzed in terms of succession of impressions, their contiguity and their constant conjunction (the latter, together with the tendency of the mind to associate constantly conjoined impressions, provides the sense of necessary connection between cause and effect). Hence, the notion of causality grows wholly out of experience.[Treatise on Human Nature; An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding.]
Kant, however, disagreed with Hume's empirical analysis of causality. He believed that such an analysis cannot produce the sense of necessity in the concept which Hume thought he had successfully accounted for. According to Kant:
...if we seek an example from the understanding in its quite ordinary employment, the proposition, 'every alteration must have a cause,' will serve our purpose. In the latter case, indeed, the very concept of cause so manifestly contains the concept of necessity of connection with an effect and of the strict universality of the rule, that the concept would be altogether lost if we attempted to derive it, as Hume has done, from a repeated association of that which happens with that! which precedes, and from a custom of connecting represent*ations, a custom originating in this repeated association, and constituting therefore a merely subjective necessity.[Critique of Pure Reason, B5]
Is there any relation between the "why?" question and the tendency of philosophers to believe that facts are necessary?
I suggest that there is. In our passage from Lovejoy, we note that the author believes the world to be non-rational, not because it is not an orderly world-he himself observes that it conforms to the very primary laws which empirical science discovers"-but because the facts about the world-its being at all, its possessing the extent that it has and the range of diversity which its components exhibits, etc. -- are just brute acts for which no intelligible reason can be given, and "which might equally have been other than they are." In other words, the world is non-rational because it is radically contingent. The same analysis can be given of the other philosophical passages we cited above. The philosophical "why?" grows out of the conflict between man's rational expectation of existence and the apparent radical contingency of the facts of the world---man's rational expectation being that the world should be capable of being seen as something that cannot be other than it is. This means that it is either necessary in itself or seen to be necessitated through some logical connection with a necessary being. In other words, no fact in it should, in the final analysis, be contingent.
And this is just what is presupposed by the philosophical "why?" For the philosophical "why?" is directed towards whatever appears to be contingent: any apparently contingent fact is susceptible to the "why?" question; namely, why that very fact is illustrated, and not otherwise? The philosophical "why?" presupposes that no fact could be contingent. An equivalent presupposition is that every fact is necessary. Hence, the "why?" question and the tendency of philosophers toward a necessitarian view can be seen to have a common source. The same thing can be said of the principle of causality, as the principle which assumes that every seemingly contingent fact has a principle of necessitation. The search for causes and principles of necessitations begin with the "why?" question and is set at rest only when such causes and principles from which the the facts can be deduced are discovered-and, in the final analysis, when all contingencies are resolved to necessities.
It is true that the "why?" question can be set at rest temporarily when a certain apparently contingent phenomenon is brought within the ambit of more general rules which are acceptable as true. This happened, for instance, when the behavior of falling bodies was brought within the purview of the universal law of gravitation. But then the universal law of gravitation itself is subject to the question "why?" for it is contingent or, at least, apparently so, since we can conceive of other patterns of behavior for free bodies in space. This is not to say that the question is ultimately answerable. As we have seen, many philosophers think it is not. But if it is not, then the world must continue to present itself to man as a mystery.
4.
We have already informally presented the logical presupposition of the question "why?" above; namely, that nothing is contingent and that everything is necessary. Since the latter is the positive rule, we shall regard it as the major presupposition, and the former as its corollary. Putting our major presupposition into symbolic form, we have
(1) P-NP
where "P" stands for any fact; "→" stands for the relation of implication that P has to NP; and "N" is the symbol (modal operator) for necessity. (1) may be read: "If P is a fact, then P is a necessary fact." or, "Given any fact, P, such fact is necessary." From (1) we may derive its corollary, namely, that if P is contingent, then it is not a fact by the process called transposition as a first step, thus:
(2)~NP→~P
Where "~" is the logical symbol for negation. (2) reads: "If P is not a necessary fact, then P is not a fact." We may complete the process of derivation as follows:
(3) CP→~NP
Where "CP" means "P is a contingent fact.” (3) reads: "If P is contingent, then P is not necessary." (3) is acceptable as part of the definition for the contingent. The contingent is more fully defined as that which is possible, but not necessary. From (3) and (2), by a process called hypothetical syllogism, we finally derive the proposition:
(4) CP→~P
Which reads: "If P is contingent, then P is not a fact."
If we are right in saying that (1) and (4) are principles basic to human thinking, then, whenever the human mind encounters seemingly, contingent facts, it would tend to be puzzled and to ask of it the question "why?" or equivalent questions. Thus, the above presuppositions provide the mind with at least what Kant called regulative principles of inquiry.
---
All of the logical procedures shown in this paper should be comprehensible to anyone who has taken a course in elementary symbolic logic. They should also be comprehensible to anyone who takes some thought in them. Symbols used are for this article only.
—-
But, at this point, one could ask: What is the source of such presuppositions. Do such presuppositions have a logical basis or are they based merely on a category of thought in the Kantian sense--something like the way the human mind is programmed to think, but not based on logical principles.
One suggestion as to its source can be found in the remark of Love. joy to the effect that the world is non-rational because no intelligible reason can be given for the brute facts that it presents, and which facts "might equally have been other than they are." This gives us a clue that perhaps the source of (1) and (4) is rational.
I venture to propose that nothing more subtle than modus ponens provides such a rational basis. This rule of inference is symbolized as follows:
(5) P→Q
P
-----------
∴Q
This means that given P Q and P, Q necessarily follows. Since the necessity of Q follows from the premisses P - Q and P, we may rewrite (5) as
(6) P→Q
P
-----------
∴NQ
Where "NQ" means "Q is at least relatively necessary"; that is, in this case, at least relatively necessary to its premisses.
It is well known that in a valid argument, the conjunction of the premisses implies the conclusion; that means that (6) may in turn be rewritten:
(7) [( P→Q).P]→NQ
Where"." is a symbol for conjunction. (7) may be read: "If P implies Q, and P, then Q is at least relatively necessary to its antecedent."
Subjecting (7) to the process called exportation, we get
(8) ( P→Q) →(P→NQ)
We can use (8) as our immediate take off stage for the derivation of (1) Substituting "P" for "Q" in (8), since Q is a variable, we get
(9) ( P→P) → (P→NP)
Since P→P is the Law of Identity and is always given as a necessary truth, we derive from (9) and P→P, (1) by modus ponens, that is
(10) P→ NP
(10) does not seem to be fully convincing at this point since it can be read: "P is necessarily given relative to the givenness of P," or "Given P. then P is necessarily given." This does not seem to be a step further than the Law of Identity itself. To strengthen our case, we shall now derive another proposition from (8), namely that if P implies Q, then if P is possible, then Q is at least relatively necessary. This can be symbolized as follows:
(11) (P→Q) → (PP→ NQ)
Where “PP” tands or "P is possible." Another way of putting (11) is that if P→Q is given as a premise, then PP→NQ can be proved as a conclusion. This can be symbolized as follows:
(12) P→Q/∴PP→ NQ
The symbol "/∴" means "to prove." The proof follows:
(13) Proof of (12)
( PQ) → (P→ NQ) (8)
P→Q Premiss
P→NQ 1, 2 Modus Ponens
~NQ→~P 3 Transposition
(~NQ→~P) → (~NQ→N~P) (8) Substitution
~NQ→ N~P 4, 5 Modus Ponens
~N~P→ ~~NQ 6 Transposition
~N~P ==PP 7 Definition
PP →~~NQ 7, 8 Substitution
PP → NQ 9 Double Negation
Q. E. D.
In turn, from (12) and the Principle of Identity, we can derive
(14) PP→NP
Substituting P for Q in (12), we get
(15) P→P/∴ PP→NP
But since P→P is always given, we immediately obtain (14) by modus ponens from (15) and the Principle of Identity. In other words, we have shown that what is possible is necessary. We are not, however, the first to discover this principle. This was stated by Parmenides in the fifth century B.C. Parmenides is regarded as the father of metaphysics. According to him:
That which can be spoken or thought needs must be, for it is possible for it... to be; ....[Fr. 6 ]
Parmenides was also the first to clearly enunciate (10) when he stated his basic postulate:
It is and cannot not-be.[Fr. 2]
This is equivalent to the statement: "What is cannot not-be." or that "Every fact is a necessary fact." Which brings us round to the fundamental logical presupposition of the philosophical "why?" namely, that everything that is is necessary and that nothing is contingent. The proof we have given above, if correct, provides us with a stronger reason why the derivative concepts of causality and necessity have always been regarded as self-evident and universal.
We are also able to explain why philosophers have intuitively presupposed that a state of nothingness should prevail as the original ontological state in relation to which, somehow, the world of phenomena must be explained. The reason is that everything-or almost everything-we can think of as existing are contingent; that is, they are such that we can always imagine that some other state of affairs than the one that actually obtains might have been illustrated. Since according to (4) there are no contingent facts, nothing should be illustrated We can also understand why philosophers like Leibniz would say that
...there is more reason in the existence of a thing than in its non-existence. And everything would exist if that were possible.[Weiner (ed), Leibniz Selections, p. 94.]
And that
... Every possible is characterized by a striving (conatus) towards existence, and may be said to be destined to exist, provided, that is, it is grounded in a necessary baing.[lbid., p. 92.]
The last statement is based on Leibniz's claim that, although everything possible would exist, if this were possible, not everything possible could exist because the existence of some is incompossible with the existence of others. There is, therefor, according to him, "a conflict of all possibles demanding existence," and it requires a necessary being-God-to make a choice of which possible or collection of possibles should exist and which should not. Leibniz's position therefore, has its grounding in (14), namely, that the possible necessarily exists, in connection with (4), which states that the contingent does not. Hence, the existent which is apparently contingent must have the source of its existence in some absolutely necessary Being. The existence of facts that seem contingent, therefore, presupposes that of an absolutely necessary Being which provides them with relative ontological necessity. Since, as Leibniz hinted above, it is incompossibility with some other possibles which makes for contingency the essential characteristic of a necessary Being, therefore, is that it is both possible and compossible with all that are possible. In such a case, (14) would apply to it without qualification, namely, that if it is possible at all, it necessarily exists. This is essentially the position of classical philosophy.
It should be said that (1), (4) and (14) are basic to rationalist philosophy, which experienced a decline in influence since Hume and Kant, Hume's denial of rationalism was based on his belief in the radical contingency of facts. He argued that given any possible fact, it is both logically possible for it either to exist or not to exist. According to him, neither the existence nor the non-existence of possibles is self-contradictory. To say, therefore, that possibles cannot exist without an external cause or that their existence requires an explanation is not logically warranted. Hence, Hume insisted that there could be no logical presumption for either the existence or non-existence of possibles. Kant, on the other hand, held that facts are capable of rational explication within the range of human experience in view of the categoreal structure of the mind, but that attempts to explicate facts beyond such range is futile and illegitimate. Therefore, according to Kant, although science is possible, metaphysics which attempts to inquire into matters beyond human experience is not. Such inquiries, Kant held, are bound to fail.
Mainly due to Hume's and Kant's influence, metaphysics- especially rationalists metaphysics-is at a low level of popularity today. Existentialism and phenomenology, logical positivism, linguistic analysis and pragmatism all have joined ranks in recent times to bring her down from her erstwhile honored position as the queen of the sciences,
Since, if our analysis is correct, this study will tend to restore to metaphysics some degree of respectability by giving its problems and presuppositions a logical grounding, it is to be expected that our arguments will probably draw fire from those who have become accustomed to regard metaphysics with costumely. We expect particularly that that part of our study which directly connects the metaphysical presuppositions to basic logical processes will draw the heaviest attack.
Our confidence in our analysis rests, among others, on the fact that it corresponds nicely with the logical presuppositions of philosophy as stated by classical philosophers: its denial of contingency (here our re-supposition is actually stronger than Hume's, for whereas Hume claimed that possibles may or may not exist, this denial is equivalent to the assertion that possibles necessarily exist (14)), its confirmation of the Parmenidean postulate, its support for the universally held principle of causality and necessity. We are also confident that our analysis is correct because it involves only a few simple steps whose validity can be immediately discerned and checked. Finally, I feel that there is an intuitive soundness in our arguments manifested by the way we actually argue about reality.
Thus, if we are right, the "why?" question is itself pregnant with philosophy.
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